Approved For Release 20302/25 ECR FT T00975 A005300320001-7

ics/p

25X1

7 October 1960

25X1

Copy No. C

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 32

NO COMMINGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHARCED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20/0

AUTH: HR 10-2

10 JUN 1980
DATE: REVIEWER: 25X

25X²

State Department review completed

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975 05300320001-7

CENTRAL INTELIGENCE BULLETIN

7 bar 1960

DAY BRIEF

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japan: American officials in Tokyo believe that the behavior of the Japanese Communist party toward the Sino-Soviet dispute indicates a reluctance to become publicly involved because of close ties with both Peiping and Moscow; party publications have assiduously tried to give the impression that no dispute exists. They believe that the party, if forced to choose now, would declare in favor of Moscow's current interpretation of Communist theory and doctrine, but that over the longer range the orientation of the Japanese Communists will be influenced by their long and close sympathetic association with the Chinese party and by the special attraction exerted by the mainland throughout Japanese society.

25X1

Ą

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300320001-725X1

	App ²⁵ Ved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79 00975A005300320001-7 25X1	
	III. THE WEST	
	Britain: Although Hugh Gaitskell suffered a major de	25X1
25X1	feat when the trade union - dominated Labor party conference rejected his pro-NATO policies, he retained the support of the party's political arm representatives from its organiza-tion in individual constituencies. This fortifies his position	
	as he faces the continuation of the left-wing challenge when the new session of Parliament opens in early November. Al- though the Labor party membership in Parliament is likely to reject or bypass the conference's endorsement of neutralism	
	and to retain Gaitskell as leader, its effectiveness as an opposition to the Macmillan government will necessarily be further reduced. (Page 4)	
	25X1	
	7 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF iii	

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300320001-7

25X1

Japanese Communists Avoid Sino-Soviet Dispute

American officials in Tokyo believe that the Japanese Communist party (JCP) is reluctant to become publicly involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute because of close ties with both Peiping and Moscow. These officials consider that the JCP—if forced to choose now—would declare in favor of Moscow's current interpretation of Communist theory and doctrine. They feel that over the longer range, however, the orientation of the Japanese Communists will be influenced by their party's long and sympathetic association with the Chinese party and by the special attraction which the mainland exerts on Japanese society.

Prior to the meeting of Communist parties in Bucharest in late June, the JCP newspaper Akahata had urged readers to study the text of three statements of the Chinese thesis which had been reprinted on 5 June in the semimonthly organ of the JCP central committee, Sekai Seiji Shiryo. However, since JCP officials learned of the disagreement between the Soviet and Chinese delegates at Bucharest, the Japanese Communist press has published only those Chinese statements which support the Bucharest communiqué. In publishing excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at the Bucharest meeting, editors of Sekai on 10 July referred to it as giving the "position of the international Communist movement," and on 25 July they published editorials from both Pravda and People's Daily supporting the communiqué.

25X1	There are unconfirmed reports that JCP leaders delayed their support of the Bucharest communique until after Liu Ning-i, Chinese Communist party central committee member	
	who visited Japan in late July, had assured them that his party "fully supported" the communique and that "there is no discord" between his and the Soviet parties.	25X1
		25X1
	<u> </u>	

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

British Labor Party Prospects

Although Hugh Gaitskell suffered a major defeat when the trade union - dominated Labor party conference rejected his pro-NATO policies, he retained most of the support of the political arm of the labor movement. Some 80 percent of the local party constituency representatives voted with Gaitskell. This will fortify his position in the face of the left-wing group, which now will carry its attack against his leadership to the moderate Labor members of Parliament.

When the Parliamentary Labor party organizes early next month for the beginning of the new session of Parliament, a large majority of the 255 Labor members will probably vote for Gaitskell's re-election as party leader. Last June, when left-wing sniping against his leadership was already extensive, he won a vote of confidence, with 179 Labor Members of Parliament approving his leadership and only 7 opposing.

Faced with this line-up, the radicals are more likely to continue their agitation now on the unilateral nuclear disarmament issue than to make an immediate all-out effort to oust Gaitskell. In any case they are gaining representation in the top party hierarchy with the conference's election of Harry Nicholas, Cousins' principal assistant in the Transport and General Workers Union, as party treasurer. The left wing also supports Harold Wilson, chancellor of the exchequer in the "shadow" cabinet and the leading contender to succeed the late Aneurin Bevan as deputy party leader.

Even if Gaitskell is re-elected, his tenure as party leader			
will be more precarious. His prospects depend on the positions			
taken by moderate supporters such as George Brown and James			
Callaghan, who feel that his leadership has been inept and a			
major factor in the party's decline. In any event intensifica-			
tion of the rift over policy and leadership will further limit			
Labor's effectiveness as the parliamentary opposition.			

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

RE100975A005300320001-7 Approved For Release TO P27 SEC